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1. Introduction
The recent addition of contactless capabilities to the Austrian “Bankomatkarte” (as
well as to most new credit cards issued by banks all across Europe and the rest of the
world) raised many security and privacy concerns. While these concerns are often
hyped in the media, contactless smartcard systems (particularly payment cards)
employ various mechanisms to mitigate attacks on the protocol layer as well as on
an organizational layer (e.g. automated fraud detection systems). Nevertheless, the
contactless interface is an additional attack vector that leads to certain new attack
scenarios (cf. [1, 4, 6, 10, 14]). Particularly the fact that a certain number of low-
value contactless transactions can be performed without the need for a PIN code
lead to an outcry in the media.
This report aims at giving an overview of the construction of such smartcards with
contactless capabilities. We start by providing an insight of what is hidden below
the plastic surface of these smartcards, and by explaining how contactless and dual
interface smartcards could be disassembled in order to get access to the bare chip
module and the bare antenna wire. We further analyze the construction principle
and the antenna design of various dual interface smartcards. Based on this analysis,
we outline and evaluate ideas for rendering the contactless functionality of these
smartcards permanently unusable without affecting any other functionality. Finally,
we sketch concepts and ideas for improving the security of smartcards that expose
contactless capabilities by adding a notion of explicit user-consent that is required
for accessing contactless functionality. We partially verify the technical feasibility of
these concepts with prototypical implementations of switchable smartcard antennas.
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2. Disassembling Smartcards
For our evaluation of switchable NFC antennas we first needed to get smartcard
chips that we could later attach to our customized antenna designs. Moreover, we
wanted to analyze the layout of antennas in existing plastic smartcards. Therefore,
we tried to disassemble some cards.
2.1 Construction Principle of a Plastic Smartcard
This section shows an example for one construction principle of a typical smartcard.
A comprehensive description of different construction principles of plastic chip cards
can be found in [13].
A smartcard typically consists of several layers (see Fig. 1) of plastic foils that are
laminated (besides lamination of foils, other methods to construct the card body
exist) on top of each other. These layers could, for instance, be
1. a transparent front cover sheet,
2. a sheet with printed graphical elements that should be visible on the front of
the card,
3. a plastic card body sheet with copper wire laid into it as the antenna,
4. a sheet with printed graphical elements that should be visible on the back of
the card, and
5. a transparent back cover sheet.
Several variations of this (in terms of the number and type of layers, embedding of
the antenna, etc.) are possible. For instance,
• a layer containing a magnetic stripe could be added,
• the cover sheets could be made printable after card manufacturing using a
thermo transfer printer or could contain a signature field, a hologram, etc., or
• the antenna could be printed on (or etched from) an inlay foil that is laminated
between two card body sheets.
Figure 1: Stacked layers of a plastic card
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(a) Laminated plastic card (b) Antenna with chip from a dis-
solved plastic card
Figure 2: MIFARE Classic card in ID-1 format
Chip modules are either added before lamination (contactless-only cards) by gluing,
welding or soldering them to the antenna or after lamination (contact + contactless
dual interface cards) by gluing them into a hole that was cut out of the card body
with a mill.
2.2 Dissolving a MIFARE Classic Card
We found that our MIFARE Classic cards can be dissolved using acetone or paint
thinner (“Nitroverdünnung”). After putting a card into a jar filled with paint thinner
and letting it rest in there for some days, the plastic layers of the card fall apart. The
inner layer (or layers?) soak with thinner and expand to a sticky soft mass, while
the thin outer layers do not soak but get ripped into thin stripes as they stick to the
expanding inner layers. The paint used for the printed graphical elements dissolves
in the thinner.
Then, the chip and the attached antenna can be ripped out of the remains of the
card body. The card (before dissolving) and the bare antenna and chip module (after
dissolving) are shown in Fig. 2. With this model, the chip is welded to the antenna.
The antenna is made of thin copper wire (5 windings, approx. 77mm 47mm) and
was laid into one of the layers of the card body.
2.3 Extracting the Chip from a Dual Interface Smartcard
In order to get a bare dual interface smartcard chip module, we decided to disassem-
ble a credit card (Fig. 3). To remove the chip module from the dual interface card,
we heated the area around the chip module to a temperature of about 200 degrees
Celsius using a heat gun. As a result, the adhesive bond that was used to mount the
module to the card body disjoint and the chip module could be removed from the
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Figure 3: Dual interface smartcard in ID-1 format
(a) front of module (b) back of module (c) hole in card body
Figure 4: Dual interface chip module and the hole in the plastic card body where
the chip module was attached
card body using tweezers. Fig. 4 shows the front and the back of the extracted chip
module and the milled hole in the card body where the chip module was attached.
On the left and the right side of the hole there are the contact pads that are used
to attach the antenna to the chip module.
This method of extracting the chip module has destructive effects to the card body.
The card body gets soft and starts to melt at this temperature. Consequently, the
card deforms and slightly shrinks at the heated area (see Fig. 5).
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(a) front (b) back
Figure 5: Deformation of the plastic card after extracting the chip module
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3. Analysis of Dual Interface Smartcard Antennas
3.1 Non-Destructive Analysis
As a next step we wanted to examine the shape and size of typical smartcard anten-
nas without destroying the cards. The best way to perform such an analysis would
possibly be to X-ray the cards. However, as we did not have access to an X-ray ma-
chine, we used a bright flashlight. The light of the flashlight shines through the card
and is blocked by the antenna wire, the metal contacts of the chip module, and,
to a significant part, also by the magnetic stripe. Hence, it is possible to see the
silhouette of the antenna. While darker colors in the artwork make it more difficult
to identify the shape of the antenna, for some cards with blank card body, we were
even able to recognize the reddish-orange color of the enameled copper wire.
Besides a visual inspection of the antenna shape, we also measured the resonant
frequencies based on the reflection coefficient (S11) observed with a vector network
analyzer (Rohde & Schwarz FSH4) using an ID-1 sized single-loop probe that is
coupled to the card-under-test.
3.2 Examination of Card Antennas
Using this method, we were able to measure the size, the position and the routing of
the antenna wire for several cards. Table 1 gives an overview of the examined cards.
Table 1: Examined cards
Manufacturer Card type Product identification or visible markings
Austria Card Austrian
“Banko-
matkarte”
(Maestro)
01/13 AUSTRIACARD 204/015 Fig. 6
Austria Card Visa 09/14 AUSTRIACARD 54833/004 Fig. 7
Winter AG /
Trüb AG
MasterCard
picture card
ICA 7751 Winter/Trüb 02/11 19893500 Fig. 8
Gemalto MasterCard
picture card
GEMALTOSGP U1061546B 0312 ICA
11409
Fig. 9
Gemalto blank card IDCore 3010 Fig. 10
unknown blank card Athena IDProtect Fig. 11
unknown blank card NXP JCOP41 V2.3.1 Fig. 12(a)
unknown blank card NXP J3A081 DI / JCOP V2.4.1 R2 Fig. 12(b)
unknown blank card NXP J3D081 DI / JCOP V2.4.2 R2 Fig. 12(c)
unknown blank card NXP JCOP41 engineering sample Fig. 12(d)
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(a) front (b) back
Figure 6: Maestro card (Austrian “Bankomatkarte”) manufactured by Austria Card
(a) front (b) back
Figure 7: Visa card manufactured by Austria Card
(a) front (b) back
Figure 8: MasterCard manufactured by Winter AG / Trüb AG
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(a) front (b) back
Figure 9: MasterCard manufactured by Gemalto
Figure 10: Gemalto IDCore 3010 manufactured by Gemalto
Figure 11: Athena IDProtect card (unknown manufacturer)
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(a) JCOP card 1 (b) JCOP card 2
(c) JCOP card 3 (d) JCOP card 4
Figure 12: Various JCOP cards (unknown manufacturers)
3.2.1 Manufacturing Process
We found that for most of the analyzed cards, the antenna is made of enameled
wire (possibly copper wire, though we could not verify this with our non-destructive
analysis method) and was laid (melted) into the card body. Typical indications for
this are overlappings of the antenna wire (which require the wire to be insulated),
curved wire endings (from the movement of the laying machine), and meander-
shaped areas of wire around the antenna contacts of the chip module.
The meander-shaped (see Fig. 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10) endings allow for production vari-
ations of the antenna position with respect to the chip module, as they create a
bigger area where the antenna contacts of the chip module can be attached to the
antenna wire with conductive adhesive.
Some cards (see Fig. 11, 12(a), 12(c)) have rectangular contact pads that protrude
beyond the area of the contact pads and connect the antenna wires with the chip
module. For one card (see Fig. 12(b)), the endings of the antenna wire were laid
straight horizontally below the chip module.
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Table 2: Antenna geometries
Card ($) Width (l) Height Windings Size in relation to card body
Fig. 6 80mm 34mm 4 2/3 of card body
Fig. 7 80mm 34mm 4 2/3 of card body
Fig. 8 80mm 34mm 4 2/3 of card body
Fig. 9 74mm 22mm 4 1/2 of card body
Fig. 10 74mm 44mm 4 full card body
Fig. 11 80mm 49mm 2 full card body
Fig. 12(a) 80mm 49mm 3 full card body
Fig. 12(b) 80mm 49mm 5 full card body
Fig. 12(c) 78mm 46mm 5 full card body
Fig. 12(d) 78mm 48mm 4 full card body
Only one card that we analyzed (see Fig. 12(d)) had an etched antenna inlay. Clear
indications for this are the plus marking in one corner of the inlay and the rectangular
area in the upper-right corner that creates a bridge from the outer winding to the
inside of the antenna.
3.2.2 Antenna Geometry
We found variations in the antenna size and in the number of windings (see Table 2).
For all cards, the antenna is about 80 millimeters wide (center of the antenna wires).
For our blank cards, the windings span across the whole card and the antenna is
about 50 millimeters tall. For the examined credit and debit cards, we found that
the antenna is located either in the upper half (approx. 22mm tall) or the upper
two-thirds (approx. 34mm tall) of the card body. That way, the antenna wires are
located either directly above or directly below the embossed card number.
The number of windings ranges from two to five. All inspected credit and debit cards
have 4 windings. For the blank cards, we found antenna designs with 2, 3, 4, and 5
windings.
3.2.3 Resonant Frequency
We found huge variations in the resonant frequency of the tested smartcards (see
Fig. 13 for all measurements). Resonant frequencies ranged from 14:5 to 76:5MHz.
The majority of cards had a resonant frequency around 18MHz. Cards tuned to
resonant frequencies between 14 and 18MHz were also found to work best in com-
bination with mobile phones. This behavior was expected as resonant frequencies
close to the operating frequency (13:56MHz) improve the energy transfer between
the reader and the card [2].
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(a) Austria Card / Maestro,
see Fig. 6
(b) Austria Card / Visa, see
Fig. 7
(c) Winter AG/Trüb AG /
MasterCard, see Fig. 8
(d) Gemalto / MasterCard,
see Fig. 9
(e) Gemalto / IDCore 3010,
see Fig. 10
(f) Athena IDProtect, see
Fig. 11
(g) Blank JCOP card 1, see
Fig. 12(a)
(h) Blank JCOP card 2, see
Fig. 12(b)
(i) Blank JCOP card 3, see
Fig. 12(c)
(j) Blank JCOP card 4, see
Fig. 12(d)
Resonant frequency
(a) 17:98MHz
(b) 18:04MHz
(c) 53:31MHz
(d) 14:49MHz
(e) 18:11MHz
(f) 76:49MHz
(g) 29:66MHz
(h) 17:09MHz
(i) 17:92MHz
(j) 28:65MHz
Figure 13: Resonant frequencies
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4. Disabling the Contactless Interface of Dual Interface Cards
As both, the contact and the contactless functionality of a dual interface smartcard
share the same chip (and, in fact, are just two different interfaces to the same
smartcard logic), the only methods to disable the contactless interface while keeping
the contact interface intact seem to be
1. to disable the contactless interface on a software level, or
2. to “unplug” the antenna from the chip.
As smartcards are security critical devices and changes to the software configuration
are typically only possible using tightly controlled keys (or even only during certain
manufacturing stages), the only option for an end-user would be to physically detach
the antenna from the chip.
4.1 Cutting the AntennaWire
Since we now know the location of the antenna within the card body, we wanted
to check if it is possible to disable the contactless interface without influencing the
remaining functionality of the card.
Looking at the cards in Fig. 6, 7, 8, and 9, the most promising location to cut
the antenna is between the magnetic stripe and the signature field on the left edge
of the card (when looking at the back of the card; right edge, when looking at
the front of the card). We chose this position as it will not influence the magnetic
stripe, is far away from the chip module, does not touch any of the visible security
features (signature field, hologram, embossing), and does not make any text elements
unreadable. Hence, the cut should not do any harm to the remaining functionality
of the card (magnetic stripe, contact interface of the chip) and should not raise too
much suspicion when using the card for payment. Moreover, this position is far away
from the edge of the card that is inserted first into an ATM. Consequently, it will not
trigger the mechanical shutter that card readers of many ATMs are equipped with
in order to protect against insertion of anything that is not a bank card (cf. [19]).
Using a junior hacksaw, we cut approx. 10mm deep into the card. We tested this
with the MasterCard picture card manufactured by Gemalto (Fig. 9) as we had a
couple of expired credit cards of this type. Figure 14 shows the position of the slit
that we cut into the card body. Due to the chosen blade, the cut became approx.
1mm wide. Cutting 10mm deep assures that we cut through all windings of the
antenna (and additionally allows for variations in the antenna position). Moreover,
this type of cut would also work for the other payment card antennas as seen in
Fig. 6, 7, and 8.
To get an in-depth insight on the effects of cutting the antenna windings, we cut the
antenna wire by wire (from the outer loop to the inner loop) and analyzed the effects
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(a) optimal position (for our cards) (b) 2 windings cut
Figure 14: Optimal position to cut the antenna loops
(a) all windings intact (b) 1 winding cut
(c) 2 windings cut (d) 3 windings cut
Figure 15: Influence of cutting the antenna windings on the resonant frequency
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on the resonant frequency and on the readability with smartcard reader hardware.
Fig. 15 shows the change of the resonant frequency after cutting each wire:
1. Before cutting, the resonant frequency is around 15MHz. The card can be
read with an HID OMNIKEY 5321 smartcard reader (both through the con-
tact interface and the contactless interface), as well as with an NFC-enabled
Android smartphone (tested with Samsung Nexus S and LG Nexus 5).
2. After cutting the first winding, the resonant frequency increased to about
71MHz. We were no longer able to read the card through its contactless in-
terface.
3. After cutting the second winding, the resonant frequency increased to about
108MHz.
4. After cutting the third winding, the resonant frequency increased to about
193MHz.
5. After cutting the last winding, we could no longer observe any peaks in the
magnitude of the reflection coefficient (S11).
In all cases, we could still successfully access the card through its contact interface.
In our tests, the contactless smartcard reader and the NFC-enabled smartphones
could no longer communicate with the smartcard over the contactless interface after
cutting the first winding. Therefore, it seems sufficient to cut the antenna in order to
prevent, for instance, usage of a card for PIN-less micropayments at regular contact-
less payment terminals. However, this empirical test result cannot be generalized to
all reader devices. An attacker with a specially crafted reader device, might still be
capable of accessing the card over its contactless interface. Moreover, an attacker
with unlimited physical access to the card (e.g. in the case of a lost or stolen card)
could try to repair (by soldering the cut wire endings) or replace the RFID antenna.
Further analysis would be necessary to evaluate if smartcards with cut antenna
windings could still be accessed over their contactless interface with a specially
crafted reader device hardware. Cutting the antenna wire essentially adds a series
capacitance to the antenna loop. This series capacitance detunes the smartcard
antenna circuit to a higher resonant frequency, as can be seen in Fig. 15. Further
research would need to analyze/simulate if sufficient power (as well as the data
signal) can be transfered to the card and if responses by the card would still be
detectable at the reader side after adding such a series capacitance.
4.2 Newer Antenna Concepts and their Possible Consequences
A new antenna technology for dual interface smartcards makes it possible to inte-
grate an antenna into the card body that does not need wired contacts to the chip
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module (cf. [3, 7, 8]). Instead, the antenna in the card body has a few additional
turns around the area where the chip module is embedded (see Fig. 16(c)). This card
body antenna inductively couples into a tiny loop antenna that is directly integrated
into the chip module (see Fig. 16(b)). This simplifies the card production process
as the antenna does not need to be attached (e.g. glued, welded or soldered) to the
chip module.
Unfortunately, this also means that the antenna of the chip module remains intact
when the card antenna is cut through. Hence, the contactless interface of cards based
on this antenna concept will likely remain accessible (at least with special reader
hardware) even after the above mentioned method for disabling the contactless in-
terface by cutting through the card antenna loops was applied.
(a) card with inductively coupled
chip module [9]
(b) chip module with
integrated antenna [8]
(c) card antenna [3]
(d) stacked layers of chip module
and embedding in card [3]
Figure 16: Card and chip module with separate, inductively coupled antennas
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5. Smartcards with Switchable Contactless Interface
There are a number of patents and products related to smartcards with switchable
contactless interface. For instance, US Pat. 10/334,572 [16], filed in 2002, introduces
various concepts of mechanically switching the antenna loop of an RFID contactless
card. The switch (see Fig. 17) is embedded into the card body and can be activated
by pressing it or by using an activator token.
Similarly, US Pat. 11/503,197 [17] describes how the antenna of an RFID contactless
card could be switched with a pressure-sensitive capacitive switch embedded into
the card (see Fig. 18). As an example, Peratech1 offers a technology to integrate
switches into smartcards [12] and gives examples for chip cards with push-buttons
as well as for inductive coupling cards with a switchable antenna [12].
US Pat. 13/701,883 [18] describes how bank cards with contact and/or contactless
interface can be enhanced with a display and push-buttons. This concept uses a
separate microcontroller that is capable of accessing the smartcard chip to control
the display and the user inputs. Fig. 19 gives an overview of such a card. MasterCard
uses such technology for their “Display Card” has an integrated LCD display and
touch-sensitive buttons for generating one-time passwords [11].
While several concepts to disable the contactless interface of smartcards exist, most
contactless and dual interface smartcards come without such mechanisms. Given
the number of patents related to embedding switches into plastic cards and clipping
the antenna of inductive-coupled contactless smartcards, we believe that it should
be fairly easy to integrate such user-controlled switching capabilities into smart-
cards. We therefore further evaluated three approaches for implementing cards with
a contactless interface that can be switched on and off by the user:
1. clipping the antenna with a switch,
2. short-circuiting the antenna close to the chip, and
3. switching the contactless interface through software on the smartcard chip.
5.1 Concept 1: Clipped Antenna
We found several patents that show how a push-button can be integrated into the
antenna of a contactless smartcard in order to clip the antenna wire unless the user
presses the button. The principle is rather simple (Fig. 20): A switch (normally
open) is added in series to the antenna. When the user wants to give access to
the contactless interface, the switch is closed and connects the antenna with the
smartcard chip. So this is essentially a reversible variant of what we did by cutting
the antenna windings in section 4.1.
1http://www.peratech.com/
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(a) mechanical button (b) reed contact with magnetic ac-
tivator key fob
Figure 17: Different approaches for mechanical switches embedded into contactless
RFID cards [16]
Figure 18: Pressure sensitive switch embedded into contactless RFID card [17]
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Figure 19: Smartcard enhanced with input and output capabilities [18]
Figure 20: Clipping the antenna with a switch
While the idea seems simple, we did not find any smartcard products that actually
make use of such technology. Therefore, we created a few proof of concept prototypes
to assess the difficulties in building such a card based on existing smartcard chips.
We used chips that we extracted (cf. section 2) from existing MIFARE Classic cards
and EMV payment cards and used enameled copper wire to shape antennas similar
to those of the plastic cards where we extracted the chips from.
5.1.1 MIFARE Classic
For our first prototype (Fig. 21), we prepared an ID-1 sized piece of cardboard and
mounted the antenna along the edge of the cardboard. We placed two rectangular
pads made of adhesive copper foil into one corner of the prototype. We soldered one
end of the antenna directly to the antenna contact pad on the chip module and the
other end to one of the copper pads. We then connected the second copper pad to
the second antenna contact pad of the chip module. The antenna circuit can now be
closed by connecting the two copper pads with a piece of metal (low resistance) or
by simply placing a finger on top of them (high resistance). Moreover, we attached
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Figure 21: Prototype 1: MIFARE Classic on cardboard
(a) copper pads
unconnected
(b) copper pads connected
with finger
(c) copper pads connected
with metal bridge
Figure 22: Prototype 1: Measurement of the reflection coefficient
a pair of additional wires to the antenna contact pads to allow for further analysis
of the signal at the antenna pads.
We found that our prototype could no longer be accessed using an HID OMNIKEY
5321 smartcard reader, as well as an NFC-enabled Android smartphone (tested
with Samsung Nexus S and LG Nexus 5). After connecting the copper contact pads
with either a metal bridge or a finger, the MIFARE Classic chip could be accessed
using both, the contactless smartcard reader as well as the Android smartphones2.
Fig. 22 shows that the switch detunes the resonant circuit of the tag. As discussed
in section 4.1, further analysis would be necessary to determine if a specially crafted
reader could be used to access the card despite the contact pads being unconnected.
As our first prototype worked quite well, we created a second prototype (Fig. 23)
using a MIFARE Classic chip. This second prototype should demonstrate that it is
possible to integrate the switching concept of prototype 1 into a laminated plastic
card. We therefore took a chip including the antenna that we previously extracted
from a plastic MIFARE Classic card. We then placed the antenna and the chip onto
2The LG Nexus 5 could only display the anti-collision identifier (UID) and the card type as the
chipset of that device does not support the proprietary MIFARE Classic protocol.
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Figure 23: Prototype 2: laminated MIFARE Classic card
(a) copper pads
unconnected
(b) copper pads connected
with finger
(c) copper pads connected
with metal bridge
Figure 24: Prototype 2: Measurement of the reflection coefficient
an ID-1 sized piece of adhesive plastic foil. We cut the antenna wire and soldered
the two open ends to copper pads that we placed in one corner of the plastic foil.
We then placed the piece of plastic foil in a thermal laminating film pouch. Before
thermal lamination, we cut a square window in one side of the pouch where the
upper side of the copper pads was located. Finally, we used a flat iron to thermally
laminate the pouch around the inner plastic foil carrying our antenna.
Tests showed that this card works equally well as our first prototype. Fig. 24 shows
measurements of the resonant circuit of the card.
5.1.2 Dual Interface Processor Smartcard
We prepared a third prototype on an ID-1 sized piece of cardboard analogous to
prototype 1. We added an antenna to the upper half of the “card” with similar
dimensions as those of the card where we extracted the chip from. We placed two
rectangular pads made of adhesive copper foil into one corner of the prototype
and soldered those pads between one end of the antenna and the smartcard chip.
Moreover, we attached a pair of additional wires to the antenna contact pads to
allow for further analysis of the signal at the antenna pads. Fig. 25 shows a modified
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Figure 25: Prototype 3: Dual interface smartcard chip on cardboard
Figure 26: Short-cicuiting the antenna with a switch
version of this prototype where the antenna is no longer routed through the copper
pads and where two additional wires were soldered to pads of the chip module.
We found that our prototype could no longer be accessed using an HID OMNIKEY
5321 smartcard reader, as well as an NFC-enabled Android smartphone (tested with
Samsung Nexus S and LG Nexus 5). After connecting the copper contact pads with
a metal bridge, the chip could be accessed using both, the contactless smartcard
reader as well as the Android smartphones. Unfortunately, we were unable to get
this prototype to work by putting a finger onto the copper pads. As the prototype
worked using a metal bridge, we can assume that this failure was due to the high
resistance through the human finger that was added in series to the antenna.
5.2 Concept 2: Short-Cicuited Antenna
As an alternative to breaking and closing the antenna loop, we also analyzed if
it would be possible to short-circuit the antenna loop by directly connecting the
antenna pads close to the chip module, hence, by placing a switch in parallel to the
antenna (see Fig. 26). In this scenario, the switch would normally be closed and
would, therefore, short-circuit the signal at the antenna pads. When the user wants
to give access to the contactless interface, the switch is opened in order to allow the
signal from the antenna to pass through to the smartcard chip.
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Figure 27: Short-cicuiting the antenna with a semiconductor switch
We tested this approach with our prototypes 1 and 3 by directly connecting the
two copper contact pads to each other and by using the additional pair of wires
that we attached to the antenna contacts to short-circuit the antenna. This method
worked with both prototypes and they could no longer be accessed while the antenna
contacts were directly connected to each other.
The disadvantage of this approach is that it requires a switch that is normally closed
and has a low resistance when closed. Therefore, copper contact pads as in concept 1
are infeasible. Instead, a mechanical switch would be necessary. Alternatively, it
might be possible to use a semiconductor switch (e.g. JFET) as shown in Fig. 27.
However, this is beyond the scope of our evaluation and may be subject to future
research.
5.3 Concept 3: On-Chip Switching of the Contactless Interface
Many typical dual-interface smartcards (specifically if compliant to Global Platform
Card Specification Amendment C [5]) allow to enable and disable the contactless
interface on a per-card basis and on a per-application (Java Card applet) basis.
Moreover, applications can identify the source interface of commands and can em-
ploy their own interface-based policies for each command. Hence, such smartcards
are capable of disabling access to functionality over the contactless interface in soft-
ware. These capabilities could be used to create an applet that manages contactless
activation and provides an ISO/IEC 7816-4 APDU-based interface to enable/disable
contactless access.
5.3.1 Using Display Cards
“Display cards”, as, for instance, deployed by MasterCard [11], add a user interface to
smartcards. With such cards, a separate microcontroller takes user inputs, generates
user outputs, and interacts with the smartcard chip (cf. Fig. 19). Such cards could
be used to enable and disable the contactless interface of a smartcard based on
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user inputs. Display cards as described in US Pat. 13/701,883 [18] typically use
the ISO/IEC 7816 contact smartcard interface to interact with the smartcard chip.
For example, pressing a button could trigger the microcontroller to send an APDU
command to the management applet that instructs it to disable the contactless
interface (possibly only for certain applications). Another button could trigger an
APDU command that instructs the smartcard chip to (re-)enable its contactless
interface.
5.3.2 Using NFC-enabled Mobile Devices
Display cards require additional circuitry to be embedded into smartcards and con-
sequently increase production costs. NFC-enabled smartphones could be used as a
cheap alternative to interact with the management applet on the card. An app on
the mobile device could provide a user interface, that lets the user select, which
applications should be accessible over the contactless interface.
5.3.3 Security Considerations for an Interface Management Applet
If contactless activation/deactivation is possible over the regular smartcard inter-
faces (ISO/IEC 7816 contact interface or ISO/IEC 14443 contactless interface), an
attacker may be able to activate contactless access without user consent. For in-
stance, if activation and deactivation is performed with simple enable and disable
commands that are not protected from unauthorized access, an attacker might be
able to issue those commands to activate interface access.
This is particularly problematic if the management applet is accessible over the con-
tactless interface (e.g. if contactless interface activation is possible with an NFC-
enabled mobile device). In that case, an attacker could simply send the activation
command prior to accessing functionality that was supposedly protected by deacti-
vation. As a countermeasure, the management applet could require authentication
based on a user-supplied PIN code or password before accepting activation and de-
activation commands. Such a PIN code or password could be easily provided by the
user through the management app on the mobile device.
In the case of a display card, the management applet would typically be accessible
only through the contact interface (as that is used by the microcontroller to ac-
cess the smartcard chip). Hence, an attacker could not simply send an activation
command over the contactless interface before accessing the protected applications
over that exact same interface. Nevertheless, malicious contact smartcard terminals,
could try to enable the contactless interface by automatically sending an activa-
tion command whenever a card is inserted. Therefore, even in that case it would
make sense to protect the management applet with some form of authentication (cf.
Google’s flawed PIN code authentication in early versions of Google Wallet [15]).
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A display card could even provide the necessary user input/output capabilities to
request a PIN code from the user.
Besides protection against attackers without physical access to a card, requiring a
user-supplied PIN code or password in order to activate certain functionality of a
smartcard could even protect the card against attackers with physical access, an
additional level of security that a simple push-button could not provide. However, it
is questionable if users would accept the additional step of typing a PIN/password
prior to using their card. After all, contactless transactions are often promoted as
fast alternative to contact-based use of smartcards.
5.3.4 Smartcard Chips with Dedicated Switching Input
Another alternative would be to directly integrate a circuitry for switching the con-
tactless interface based on user inputs into the smartcard microchip. A dedicated pin
of the smartcard chip (accessible through the chip module) could be connected to a
push-button or a capacitive input pad. Based on the sensed state of this switching
input, the whole contactless interface could be enabled or disabled. This would pro-
vide a more cost-effective, reliable, and simple alternative to using a display card or
an additional NFC-enabled mobile device. However, this would not protect against
attackers with physical access to the card.
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6. Summary
We showed how contactless and dual interface smartcards are constructed and where
their antenna is located. We demonstrated simple and reliable methods to render
the contactless interface of smartcards (permanently) unusable while maintaining
all other functionality. Moreover, we presented and evaluated various concepts for
making the contactless interface switchable by the end-user in order to improve the
(perceived) security of contactless smartcards.
28 | EVALUATIONOF CONTACTLESS SMARTCARDANTENNAS
References
[1] Anderson, R.: Position Statement in RFID S&P Panel: RFID and the Middle-
man. In: Financial Cryptography and Data Security, LNCS, vol. 4886/2007,
pp. 46–49. Springer Berlin Heidelberg (2007)
[2] Finkenzeller, K.: RFID-Handbuch. Carl Hanser Verlag München, 4th edn.
(2006)
[3] Finn, D., Czornack, J.T., Lotya, M., Fendt, T., Ummenhofer, K.: Antenna
modules for dual interface smart cards, booster antenna configurations, and
methods, US Pat. 14/078,527 (Apr 2014), http://www.google.com/patents/
US20140104133
[4] Francis, L., Hancke, G.P., Mayes, K.E., Markantonakis, K.: Practical Relay
Attack on Contactless Transactions by Using NFC Mobile Phones. Cryptology
ePrint Archive, Report 2011/618 (2011), http://eprint.iacr.org/2011/618
[5] GlobalPlatform: Contactless Services, GlobalPlatform Card Specification v2.2,
Amendment C, Version 1.0.1 (Feb 2012)
[6] Hancke, G.P.: A Practical Relay Attack on ISO 14443 Proximity Cards (Jan
2005), http://www.rfidblog.org.uk/hancke-rfidrelay.pdf, retrieved in Sep 2011
[7] Hofer, G., Holweg, G., Pachler, W.: Booster antenna for a chip arrangement,
contactless smart card module arrangement and chip arrangement, US Pat.
14/043,915 (Jun 2014), http://www.google.com/patents/US20140158775A1
[8] Infineon Technologies AG: Coil on Module (CoM) – Infineon’s Innova-
tive Chip Package Technology, Product Brief B180-H9799-X-X-7600 (Apr
2013), http://www.infineon.com/export/sites/default/media/Applications/
ChipCards/Coil_on_Module_Product_Brief_04.2013.pdf, retrieved in May
2015
[9] Infineon Technologies AG: Infineon introduces revolutionary “Coil on Module”
package technology for Dual Interface eIDs, eDrivers’ licenses or eHealth Cards,
Press Release INFCCS201410-005 (Oct 2014), http://www.infineon.com/cms/
en/about-infineon/press/press-releases/2014/INFCCS201410-005.html, re-
trieved in May 2015
[10] Kfir, Z., Wool, A.: Picking Virtual Pockets using Relay Attacks on Contactless
Smartcard. In: Proceedings of the First International Conference on Security
and Privacy for Emerging Areas in Communications Networks (SecureComm
2005), pp. 47–58. IEEE, Athens, Greece (Sep 2005)
REFERENCES |29
[11] MasterCard: MasterCard Introduces Next Generation ‘Display Card’ Technol-
ogy, a first for Singapore, Press Release (Nov 2012), http://bit.ly/TI3a90, re-
trieved in May 2015
[12] Peratech Holdco Ltd: QTC Material Technology – RFID & Card Security, http:
//www.peratech.com/rfid-and-card-security.html, retrieved in May 2015
[13] Rankl, W., Effing, W.: Handbuch der Chipkarten. Carl Hanser Verlag München,
4th edn. (2002)
[14] Roland, M., Langer, J.: Cloning Credit Cards: A combined pre-play and down-
grade attack on EMV Contactless. In: 7th USENIX Workshop on Offensive
Technologies (WOOT ’13). USENIX, Washington, DC, USA (Aug 2013)
[15] Roland, M., Langer, J., Scharinger, J.: Applying Relay Attacks to Google Wal-
let. In: Proceedings of the Fifth International Workshop on Near Field Com-
munication (NFC 2013). IEEE, Zurich, Switzerland (Feb 2013)
[16] Selker, E.J.: Manually operated switch for enabling and disabling an RFID card,
US Pat. 10/334,572 (Dec 2002), https://www.google.com/patents/US6863220
[17] Tanner, C., Marshall-Rees, S.: Proximity payment card with user-actuated
switch and methods of making the card, US Pat. 11/503,197 (Aug 2006),
https://www.google.com/patents/US7900843
[18] Thill, M., Gravez, P., Marseille, F.X.: Bank card with display screen, US Pat.
13/701,883 (Jun 2011), https://www.google.com/patents/US8708232
[19] Wincor Nixdorf: Anti-card trapping – Protection against card attacks,
Datasheet (Sep 2014), http://www.wincor-nixdorf.com/internet/cae/servlet/
contentblob/1250576/publicationFile/85878/AnticardTrapping_Datasheet_
Download.pdf, retrieved in Jun 2015
